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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-1752 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
  
BRANDON H. SCHNETZKA, 
                                                         Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-13-cr-00208-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 18, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Brandon Schnetzka appeals the District Court’s judgment of conviction and 
sentence. Schnetzka’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
I 
 Schnetzka pleaded guilty to one count of impersonating an officer or employee of 
the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912. Schnetzka’s offense level under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) was determined to be four, yielding a 
Guidelines range of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment. However, the Probation Office stated 
that an upward departure may be warranted because Schnetzka’s criminal history did not 
adequately reflect the seriousness of his past conduct and because prior convictions were 
not assigned points. At the sentencing hearing, Schnetzka’s counsel argued that an 
upward departure was not warranted because all of Schnetzka’s crimes were economic 
and nonviolent in nature and because he was facing criminal charges in other jurisdictions 
for similar crimes.  
 After hearing arguments from both sides, the District Court imposed a two-level 
upward departure based on Schnetzka’s criminal history—which revolved around theft by 
deception, forgery, bad checks, and receiving stolen property—and its finding that he 
presented a “significant financial danger to the community.” App. 40. This upward 
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departure yielded a new Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months, and the Court sentenced 
Schnetzka to 18 months’ imprisonment. 
 Schnetzka filed this timely appeal, and his counsel moved to withdraw.1  
II 
 We begin by considering whether counsel’s brief adequately fulfills the Anders 
requirements and whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous 
issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). “The duties of counsel 
when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thoroughly 
examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are 
frivolous.” Id. Counsel identified three potential grounds for appeal—the jurisdiction of 
the District Court, the voluntariness of Schnetzka’s plea, and the reasonableness of his 
sentence—and argued that they all lack merit. Schnetzka did not file a pro se brief. 
 Although Schnetzka’s counsel adequately explained why there are no non-
frivolous issues for appeal, we find that his brief is inadequate because it omits important 
information. We first note that counsel’s introduction claims that Schnetzka pleaded 
guilty to failing to update his sex offender registration. See Schnetzka Br. 11. In fact, 
Schnetzka pleaded guilty to impersonating an officer or employee of the United States. 
Moreover, although counsel correctly notes that the Court imposed a two-level upward 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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departure, his brief neither describes Schnetzka’s adjusted Guidelines range nor explains 
that Schnetzka’s final sentence is within that range. These omissions required the Court to 
mine the record to ascertain that Schnetzka’s sentence was indeed within the adjusted 
Guidelines range. 
 Nevertheless, we will not appoint new counsel, as we do not need further 
assistance. See United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). After 
independent review of the record, we are satisfied that there are no nonfrivolous bases for 
appeal essentially for the reasons noted by counsel for Schnetzka and the United States. 
 The first potential ground for appeal is whether the District Court had jurisdiction 
to enter the conviction and impose sentence. As Schnetzka was charged with violating 
federal law by impersonating a federal agent and there is no dispute that the crime 
occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, his offense was amenable to the 
jurisdiction and venue of the District Court. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 912, 3231; Fed. R. Crim. P. 
18. 
 The second potential ground is whether Schnetzka’s guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969). A sentencing court 
may not accept a guilty plea until it explains to the defendant the rights he gives up by 
pleading guilty and confirms that the defendant understands that he is waiving those 
rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The District Court fulfilled this requirement by conducting, 
on the record, a colloquy in which Schnetzka asserted that he understood the nature of his 
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crime, the maximum potential sentence he faced, and the rights he was waiving by 
pleading guilty. 
 The last potential ground for appeal is whether Schnetzka’s sentence was 
reasonable. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion and 
will affirm a sentence imposed “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Here, 
Schnetzka was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, which was at the top of his final 
Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months.2 In so doing, the District Court considered the 
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Schnetzka’s criminal history and the 
danger he presents to the community. Moreover, the Court explained that it had 
considered a three-level upward departure, but took into account Schnetzka’s medical 
history and pending criminal charges in other cases and determined that a two-level 
departure was adequate. Given the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard governing this 
issue, and that Schnetzka received a within-Guidelines sentence for reasons that are clear 
from the record, any challenge to his sentence would be frivolous.  
                                                 
 2 Although not raised by either Schnetzka’s counsel or the Government, we note 
that the District Court never formally calculated the applicable Guidelines range, either 
before or after it imposed a two-level upward departure. Nevertheless, the record makes 
clear that Schnetzka’s original Guidelines range was 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment based 
on an offense level of four and his 16 criminal history points. The Court’s two-level 
upward departure increased Schnetzka’s offense level to six and yielded a final adjusted 
Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment. USSG ch. 5, pt. A. 
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III 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Because the issues presented on appeal lack legal merit, 
counsel is not required to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court under Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(c). 
